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: American Missle Defense : Flirting With Disaster
: We live in memorable times, that is for certain. The
American plan for building
: a national missile defense (NMD) system to protect the American people
and
: our allies from nuclear and biochemically equipped ballistic missiles
is a frightening
: flirtation with disaster, and the plan will surely shift the paradigm
of nuclear safety
: world-wide. Standing in the way of any new system is the 1972 Russian-American
: Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty [1]
which has played a central role in defining
: the current era of nuclear arms control by cementing deterrence, the
policy of
: mutually assured destruction, as the primary defense against nuclear
and
: biochemical conflict.
: The mainstream media has covered the Bush administration's
speedy steps
: toward missile defense quite faithfully. However, they completely
fail to describe
: the government policy of recent years which set the stage for the
today's
: controversy. They have also largely ignored the nagging, and important
question
: about what is truly at stake with the NMD plan, and whether it is
the best way of
: achieving the goal of American security. How will having a missile
defense system
: upset the tenuous international balance of power? Why is the Bush
administration
: putting the NMD on a fast-track? And will the NMD truly protect the
United States
: against the much touted 'rogue nations'? What alternatives are available
to
: the NMD?
: The importance of history :
: Before we can understand what the consequences of the
new nuclear-arms
: paradigm, it is critical to understand the current one, and why nations
are reluctant
: to leave it. A background
briefing (from Structure & Strangeness) will give you the
: relevant understanding of the historical context.
: Treading on dangerous ground :
: In a world with multiple nuclear powers and an entrenched
policy of deterrence,
: there are two principle dangers associated with a nation building
a national missile
: defense, functional or not. (For this argument, we'll largely focus
only on the
: nuclear threat, world-wide still the primary weapon of mass destruction,
but bio-
: chemical agents may replace the warhead's payload. In terms of analysis,
: there is only a small difference between the two in the overall impact
to
: international stability.)
: First, having a NMD reduces the danger of engaging
in a small-scale nuclear conflict
: as perceived by the nation bearing the shield. With the ability to
neutralize a small
: volley of warheads, such a nation would have the prerogative to involve
itself in conflicts
: which it previously avoided due to nuclear deterrence. It also reduces
the importance
: of international diplomacy as the primary mechanism for maintaining
a balanced
: and stable nuclear playing field. As has been shown in automobile
driving, when a
: driver has more safety features protecting him, he tends to take more
risks - that
: human risk-taking occurs within a well-defined 'comfort
zone' [12] and installing
: safety measures widens the range of danger with which the driver is
comfortable.
: Nuclear arms, in some sense, are nothing more than driving at the
international
: level: by intentionally keeping everyone's comfort zones at a minimum,
everyone
: drives a little more safely.
: Second, with one nation possessing a national missile
defense, all other nations
: with nuclear capability, and especially those who desire that ability,
are encouraged
: to escalate their nuclear arms programs to surpass/overwhelm said
missile shield.
: Technologically, it is significantly easier to make a missile *harder*
to hit, than it
: is to get better at hitting them (e.g. hitting an ICBM is harder than
trying to shoot a
: bullet out of the air with another gun). As early as 1983, when SDI
was announced,
: the American
military recognized that implementing any anti-ballistic missile
system
: would likely provoke a technological competition of counter- vs. counter-counter-
: measures [11], so why is it suddenly acceptable
to enter into a new world-wide
: arms-race?
: Arms-races themselves are circular in nature. Because
all nations resist an un-level
: playing field, any new weapon which gives a single player or group
of players a
: distinct advantage obligates others to re-level the playing field
by developing
: counter-measures which eliminate the advantage. Nuclear arms have
been the
: single exception to this rule of war, most significantly because of
the gentlemen's
: agreements embodied in the ABM [1] and NPT
[7] Treaties. Why? Because a
: nation who does not recognize the danger of nuclear conflict will
not be around
: very long to learn from the experience. Particularly with regard to
the US's arms
: stockpile, any nation engaging in a nuclear exchange would be completely
wiped
: from the face of the planet.
: Thus, in a world balanced by the threat of nuclear retaliation
(M.A.D.), peace is
: maintained by appealing to the human instinct of self-preservation.
This reliance
: worked throughout the bi-polar Cold War, but in the new multi-polar
world, doubt
: has been raised as to whether all nuclear, and more particularly,
ballistic missile-
: enabled states will continue to work within this uncomfortable, but
life-preserving
: peace.
: Rogue states :
: The Clinton administration BMDO's 1993 charter actually
called for it to develop and
: acquire missile defense systems for theater and national defense.
It was thought
: that the delicate balance of nuclear deterrence would be easily toppled
by an
: accidental launch or by an irrational nuclear-capable 'rogue' state
[13]. This
: uncomfortable potential for the current Mexican standoff to be broken
unexpectedly
: has been the keystone argument in justifying renewed attempts at developing
a
: missile defense.
: Imagine, for instance, if the Afganistan Taliban and/or
Osama bin-Ladin became
: nuclear- and ICBM-capable (both required to nuke US soil). The United
States
: government has been terrified for the past decade that the threat
of all-out nuclear
: retaliation would not prevent such extremist groups from using their
new-found
: nuclear power.
: Before accepting this conjecture, we must ask what exactly
constitutes a 'rogue'
: state? So far, the US government has only supplied examples: North
Korea, Iran
: and Iraq. Other lesser threats include Libya, Syria, Cuba and Sudan
[14]. A cynical
: appraisal measure's a nation's 'rogueness' by how little influence
the U.S. holds in
: said nation. Said another way, rogue nations simply don't respect
the US dominance
: in the world theater. Let us simply call them 'unfriendly' states,
whose national
: interests conflict with the United States' national interests.
: In 1993, however, there were no unfriendly states capable
of launching a nuke-
: enabled ICBM that would reach US soil, nor did any appear to be able
to develop
: such technology in the near future. In the CIA's 1995 National Intelligence
Estimate
: (NIE) report estimated that within a 10 - 15 year period, there might
develop one
: such agent [13]. Did that agent materialize?
The Clinton administration was in
: charge for 8 years - why did it not pursue the NMD vigorously within
the established
: time table and negotiate the appropriate changes to the ABM Treaty
in preparation
: for its deployment in anticipation of a rogue state becoming nuclear?
Clinton, it
: seemed, was uncomfortable with acquiessing to the Congressional hawks
who
: had been calling for a NMD since the 1970s. Rather, he preferred diplomacy
and
: continued arms-reduction as an arms policy.
: Enter Donald Rumsfeld :
: In response to the NIE report, US Congressional Republicans,
convinced that the
: danger was much closer than 2005 - 2010, created a 1998 bi-partisan
commission,
: chaired by then former Secretary of Defense (under Gerald Ford) Donald
Rumsfeld
: to file a more thorough report on the danger to US soil by ballistic
missiles. The
: Rumsfeld Commission's report has become the guiding document for
US NMD
: policy, and it doesn't seem to be a coincidence that Rumsfeld has
returned as
: Bush Jr.'s Secretary of Defense.
: The report's critical finding was that an unfriendly
nation could, via in-house
: development and, more importantly, international assistance, become
nuclear-
: and ICBM-capable in just 5 years. Additionally, such a nation could
do this largely
: undetected by conventional US intelligence [14].
The report did not, however,
: advocate a NMD as a solution as it did not analyze any options of
addressing the
: shortened time-table for nuclear proliferation.
: Because of the Rumsfeld report and the uncertainty it
indicated about the future
: nuclear landscape, Clinton reluctantly began to put more money behind
the BMDO
: but refrained from making a decision about actual deployment. However,
Clinton's
: preferred method of national security was diplomacy, not military
power. In a world
: more economically interdependent, and more (internationally) democratic
than that
: of the Cold War, military power is perhaps not as reliable a strategy
was formerly
: true. Diplomacy, certainly, is a more reliable method of maintaining
a status quo.
: The Status Quo? :
: The NPT Treaty was intended to keep the division between
nuclear and non-nuclear
: nations fixed. The US, Russia, China, Britain and France are the de
facto nuclear
: powers (as in 1968 with the treaty's creation), and all but four other
world nations
: have agreed to preserve that order. Lately, however, the Rumsfeld
report claims that
: the NPT is failing. Isreal, Pakistan and India, three of the four
nations who hadn't
: signed the treaty by 2000, are now all nuclear-able, in part because
of systems and
: knowledge acquired from China and Russia in violation of the NPT [14].
: However, Isreal, Pakistan and India are not classified
as unfriendly nations. North
: Korea, Iraq and Iran, are implicated as principles in unbalancing
the nuclear peace.
: What are their capabilities with and intentions for ballistic technology?
: Iraq has apparently acquired some forbidden weapons
materials, and is certainly a
: potential future aggressor, but for now is a minor threat with international
weapons
: inspections and economic sanctions. North Korea, with its Taepo Dong-2
ballistic
: missile however, is capable of hitting US soil in Haiwaii and Alaska.
North Korea has
: the greatest potential of acquiring the ability to target a larger
portion of US soil in
: the future, too. You can imagine that the term 'rogue states' now
primarily refers
: to North Korea.
: But North Korea and Iran have both recently both become
more amenable to the
: West, which in turn may reduce their potential for future ballistic
aggression. Despite
: the Rumsfeld report's worst-case scenario time-table of 5 years between
a foreign
: country's desire for and deployment of ICBM technology, the
1998 CIA response to
: the Rumsfeld report, and events to date, indicate that North Korea's
BM program
: has followed a longer, by 5-10 years, schedule than the worst-case
[15].
: So why the continued parade about the danger of rogue
states? The Rumsfeld
: report's description of the danger relies heavily upon playing up
the 'uncertain
: transitions' within Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and
Iran. By their
: measure, that uncertainty is uncomfortable because ballistic/nuclear
systems,
: materials and/or knowledge is less well-controlled. To put it perhaps
bluntly, the
: West is sane and stable, but everyone else might possibly become irrational
: and suicidal in the future. Additionally, China and Russia are implicated
as major
: instigators of nuclear proliferation by allowing their systems and
knowledge to be
: purchased on the international market [14].
The politicians, mostly Republican,
: concluded this situation necessitates a NMD for continued US security.
: Full-speed ahead :
: In 2000, Clinton said he would make an executive decision
regarding the
: deployment of an American NMD based on four criteria: the threat,
the cost, the
: impact on U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions, and whether the system
works [16].
: Clinton decided against deployment under those criteria; however,
Bush has stated
: (guided by Mr. Rumsfeld himself, now the Secretary of Defense again)
that he plans
: to move ahead with NMD based merely upon the first criteria: the threat
[3].
: Politically, this kind of unilateral action will do nothing more than
cement the
: growing international opinion of the US as an arrogant bully who believes
that
: normal modes of diplomacy are subordinate to US security. Part of
this disregard
: for the international court is linked to the Republican's desire to
retain for the US
: options and flexibility for an uncertain future.
: Dr. Richard Garwin, a member of the Rumsfeld Commission
and an advisor to the
: US government for over 50 years on nuclear-arms matters, notes that
the current
: US NMD is not scaled with respect to a threat from North Korea, but
rather a threat
: from China [17]. Why is that? In his analysis,
the NMD will prompt China to more
: quickly modernize its nuclear weapons, deploying them on mobile, sea-based
launch
: vehicles so as to circumvent the US NMD. This fact complicates the
apparent
: motivation for the NMD significantly. It would seem that China is
worrying the US a
: little more than the US would like to admit. Additionally, it hits
right upon the
: fundamental flaw of any NMD - the arms escalation and relative easy
with which a
: nation so intent can circumvent the shield.
: The path not taken :
: The Rumsfeld Commission report has become the justification
for deploying a
: NMD, breaking with the ABM Treaty and forging ahead into unknown nuclear-arms
: territory. Bush and the Pentagon seem confident that the military's
NMD will be
: able to protect the nation from any unknown surprises in the future,
be they
: from North Korea, Iraq or even China. The few hundred interceptors
planned
: would still be a small threat to Russia's immense arsenal.
: The NMD initiative however, is likely destined to fail
for several reasons. French
: President Jacques Chirac puts it rather succinctly in an
interview with the New
: York Times, saying: "If you look at world history, ever since
men began waging
: war, you will see that there's a permanent race between sword and
shield. The
: sword always wins. The more improvements that are made to the shield,
the
: more improvements are made to the sword." [16a,b]
: Garwin states that the Rumsfeld report absolutely does
not call for or justify the
: deployment of a NMD [18]. In the Bulletin
for the Atomic Scientists, he asserts
: that any nation capable of ICBM technology, and not just the current
nuclear powers,
: would necessarily also have the sophistication to employ the simple
counter-measures
: necessary to completely defeat the American NMD. Biological weapons,
employing
: 'bomblets' would be virtually impossible to destroy once the warhead
separates
: from the ICBM carriage [19].
: In place of the NMD, Garwin suggests a 'boost-phase
interceptor' (BPI) which
: destroys a ballistic missile before the warhead (and counter-measures)
can be
: deployed. BPIs must be stationed close to the launch site (a few hundred
miles),
: and would be useless against missiles launched from inside Russia
or China [19].
: Russia has previously expressed support for a BPI program, and such
a cooperation
: (as BPI stations on Russian soil would necessarily be jointly operated)
may even
: improve shaky Russian-US relations. Lacking such international cooperation,
BPI
: could still be installed on naval vessels close to potential unfriendly
states.
: Why is the Bush administration continuing to pursue
an initiative that seems
: so unlikely to achieve the publicly stated goal of ensuring US security?
I can't
: offer an clear statement on that matter, but will instead offer the
hypothesis that
: the Republican administration fears diplomacy and would prefer the
self-reliance
: of a military solution.
: To NMD or not to NMD :
: At its heart, national missile defense is a fatally
flawed initiative. Its capacity for
: defending the United States against any nuclear attack is small considering
the
: likely failure due to simple counter-measures. Additionally, its potential
for igniting
: a new arms race among the nuclear powers, both old and new, is frightening.
The
: threat to US security from such an arms race seems greater than that
of cooperating
: internationally to contain nuclear proliferation in multi-polar world.
: There still remains the potential that the US could
be attacked by another nation
: at some point in the future. One worrying factor, and one which should
be addressed
: immediately and diplomatically, is Russia and China's role in nuclear-proliferation.
: The Rumsfeld Commission's worst-case scenario estimation of a 5-year
delay in a
: country wanting and getting working ICBM technology is a piece of
knowledge worth
: chewing on, but it's not a sufficient justification for hastily deploying
an expensive,
: easily circumvented and politically dangerous NMD.
: A vigorous program to reduce the world's nuclear (world-wide,
roughly 30,000 war-
: heads) and biochemical arsenals would do much to allay the US desire
for ballistic
: protection. Also, by cooperatively working (with Russia, Britain,
France and China) to
: develop and operate BPI programs, the US could breathe new life into
the Non-
: Proliferation Treaty and the status quo it represents. Diplomacy,
not the military,
: would seem to be the only national missile defense that has no counter-measure
: and which technology or political development will not render obsolete.
: © 2001, Aaron Clauset
: References :
: [1] Anti-Ballistic Missle Treaty (1972)
: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/
: [3] "Dropping the Bomb", Newsweek © 2001
: http://www.msnbc.com/news/588538.asp?cp1=1
: [7] Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)
: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/index.html
: [11] Carnagie Non-Proliferation Project
: http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ballisticmissilechart.htm
: [12] Driver 'Comfort Zones'
: http://www.smartmotorist.com/tes/tes.htm
: [13] The End of the Star Wars Era (DoD News Briefing,
1993)
: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/d930513.htm
: [14] Rumsfeld Commission report (1998)
: http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/105thcongress/BMThreat.htm
: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/s980731-rumsfeld.htm
: [15] Robert Wadpole (CIA) on North Korea's Taepo Dong
missile
: http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/1998/walpole_speech_120898.html
: [16a] New York Times with French President Jacques Chirac
(1999)
: http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/ef/nmdleaders.html
: [16b] John Isaacs on Missile Defense (2000)
: http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00isaacs.html
: [17] Interview with Dr. Richard Garwin (2000)
: http://www.fas.org/rlg/000508-cen.htm
: [18] Op-Ed by Dr. Richard Garwin, member of the Rumsfeld
Commission (1998)
: http://www.fas.org/rlg/28garw.html
: [19] Dr. Richard Garwin, "The Wrong Plan"
: http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00garwin.html
: [b] Possible Soviet Responses to the US Strategic Defense
Initiative (declassified)
: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/m8310017.htm
: [c] National Missle Defense
: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/nmd/index.html
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