What is controllable

Conclusions

# Ebola and Influenza — Perception & reality

Dennis Chao


Vaccine and Infectious Disease Division Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center

February 26, 2015




## Public Concern About Getting Sick from Ebola by Level of Education

% saying they are concerned that they or someone in their immediate family may get sick from Ebola during the next 12 months




Harvard School of Public Health/SSRS, Ebola poll, August 13-17, 2014

#### **Ebola cases the United States**




#### Ebola outbreaks since 1976



data from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\_of\_Ebola\_outbreaks, downloaded Feb 24, 2015

#### Influenza deaths in the United States



Data from: Doshi. Trends in Recorded Influenza Mortality: United States, 1900–2004. Am J Public Health. 2008 May;98(5):939-45

## Ebola vs influenza




## Ebola




Influenza

transmission route transmissibility case fatality annual cases blood, feces, vomit high (in some settings) 50–70% hundreds



airborne moderate 0.001–2% hundreds of millions?



hundreds of thousands?

annual deaths



Background

Transmissibility

#### How do we count cases?

Active



(Can be) accurate, expensive

Door-to-door or telephone surveys, contact tracing

## Passive




Can miss mild cases, hard to extrapolate

Hospital and death records, internet search, medicalrelated purchase histories

Surveillance systems combine active and passive approaches to measure populations.

#### How do we count ebola cases?



Ebola cases in Liberia. London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. http://ntncmch.github.io/ebola/liberia\_sitrep.html

- Hospitals and clinics (should) report how many seek care for ebola.
- But not everyone seeks care at medical facilities.
- Underreporting may be as high as 50% in the current ebola epidemic.
  - Estimating the number of cases may require comparing different data sources (hospitalization vs death reports), active surveillance in remote communities, and/or mathematical modeling.

## Since ebola symptoms are severe, it is easier to count cases.

### How do we count influenza cases?

Active



(Can be) accurate, expensive

# Door-to-door or telephone surveys, contact tracing

## Passive




Hospital and death records, internet search, medicalrelated purchase histories

How good is this for influenza?

Can miss mild cases, hard to extrapolate

Conclusions

#### Influenza-related deaths




http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly

Monitor "excess" pneumonia and influenza deaths in a sample of hospitals. Elderly influenza cases have higher mortality than younger cases.

Conclusions


#### Influenza-like illness



http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly

ILI is defined as fever (temperature of 100°F [37.8°C] or greater) and a cough and/or a sore throat without a KNOWN cause other than influenza.


#### **Confirmed influenza infections**



http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly

#### Some influenza patient samples are tested in the lab.

#### How do we count influenza cases?



• As many as 140 influenza illnesses for every laboratory confirmed case.


Reed, Angulo, Swerdlow, Lipsitch, Meltzer, Jernigan, Finelli. Estimates of the prevalence of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, United States, April–July 2009. Emerg Infect Dis. 2009 Dec;15(12):2004–7.

## Each level in the pyramid can introduce error and uncertainty.

Background

Transmissibility


## How transmissible are pathogens?



- R<sub>0</sub> is popular measure of transmissibility.
- R<sub>0</sub> is the number of people that a typical infected person infects in a fully susceptible population.

Conclusions


#### How transmissible are pathogens?




pathogen	$R_0$
Influenza	1.1–2.0
Ebola	1.7–2.0
SARS	2.7
Smallpox	3
Rubella	6–7
Measles	7–12

Disease can spread exponentially.


## How does vaccination reduce transmission?



- Individual-level benefit: Vaccination reduces the chances of infection.
- Population-level benefit: Vaccination reduces the number of people a person can infect.
- If infected people infect less than
  1 other on average (R<sub>0</sub><1), outbreaks will not occur.




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


(	assuming	а	perfect	vaccine)
L		-	P	

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
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
Measles 7-12

(assuming a perfect vaccine)



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
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(assuming a perfect vaccine)

## Critical vaccination fraction




- The *critical vaccination fraction* is the proportion of the population that needs to be vaccinated to prevent outbreaks.
- Basically, vaccinate enough to drive R<sub>0</sub> below 1.
- The critical vaccination fraction depends on R<sub>0</sub> and the vaccine efficacy, VE:  $\frac{1-1/R_0}{VE}$

### Measles vaccination coverage around the world


#### Vaccination coverage worldwide

With 91% of 1-year-olds vaccinated, the United States comes in ahead of the WHO's 2015 target, but behind the 80 countries that have already attained the WHO's 2020 target of 95%.



Measles by the numbers: A race to eradication. Nature 518:148–149. 2015. Annotation added by Dennis.


#### Local MMR vaccination coverage



https://data.kingcounty.gov/dataset/Kindergarten-MMR-Vaccine-Coverage/kbfa-mvcb


## How long does it take to infect someone else?


## **Relationships between time periods**



Field Epidemiology Manual. https://wiki.ecdc.europa.eu/fem

#### Transmissibility + speed can be used to model outbreaks








William Kermack 1898–1970

Anderson McKendrick 1876–1943


#### Calculus is often used to model epidemic dynamics.

Conclusions

### Simple epidemic dynamics



#### What outbreaks are containable?



Field Epidemiology Manual. https://wiki.ecdc.europa.eu/fem


**Influenza:** Many asymptomatic but infectious cases. Short generation time.

**Ebola:** Cases are not very infectious until late. Longer generation time. Clinical disease is debilitating.

**SARS:** Most cases are symptomatic. Little transmission before symptoms appear.

**Measles:** Highly transmissible. Vaccination is very effective. **HIV:** Highly infectious before symptoms appear.

#### Projecting the ebola epidemic with models



Ebola Cases Could Reach 1.4 Million Within Four Months, C.D.C. Estimates. New York Times. September 2014.

#### Cumulative number of cases

Washington. Estimating the Future Number of Cases in the Ebola Epidemic - Liberia and Sierra Leone, 2014-2015. MMWR Surveill Summ 63:1-14, 2014.

### With initial R<sub>0</sub> and generation time estimates, one can forecast epidemic spread.

#### (Over-) estimating Ebola




The reality of the Ebola outbreak is not reflected by model projections of high case numbers.

EPIDEMIOLOGY

## Models overestimate Ebola cases

Rate of infection in Liberia seems to plateau, raising questions over the usefulness of models in an outbreak.


Models overestimate Ebola cases. November 2014.



Ending the Ebola Outbreak. New York Times. February 2015.

# Projections may assume that the epidemic will maintain its initial course.

#### Ebola transmission in hospitals and funerals



Faye, Boëlle, Heleze, Faye, Loucoubar, Magassouba, Soropogui, Keita, Gakou, Bah, Koivogui, Sall, Cauchemez. Chains of transmission and control of Ebola virus disease in Conakry, Guinea, in 2014: an observational study. Lancet Infect Dis. In press.

- "Ebola virus disease who were not health-care workers infected a mean of 2.3 people (95% Cl 1.6–3.2): 1.4 (0.9–2.2) in the community, 0.4 (0.1–0.9) in hospitals, and 0.5 (0.2-1.0) at funerals."
- "After the implementation of infection control in April, the reproduction number in hospitals and at funerals reduced to lower than 0.1."
- "In the community, the reproduction number dropped by 50% for patients that were admitted to hospital, but remained unchanged for those that were not."

# Behaviors change and authorities take action during large outbreaks.

## Summary and conclusions

- Epidemiologists design surveillance systems to detect and quantify infectious disease transmission.
- Mathematical modelers use these data for projections and to estimate the impact of interventions.
- Early projections may be inaccurate, but can be useful. One should not extrapolate trends too far into the future.
- It is hard to predict behavioral responses to epidemics. Fear (or lack of fear) can have a large effect.
- Someone else needs to communicate infectious disease risk to policymakers and the general public.



What is controllable

Conclusions

## Thank you!



Boukan Kare, Haiti. Photo by D. Chao

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