

Measuring Censorship Everywhere All the Time

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Goal

- Measure censorship everywhere all the time
- Problems:
 - no vantage points in country
 - not in right city/institution/building/etc.



?



Our solution

- Side channels: turn ordinary machines into vantage points
- Measure IP censorship off-path
- No software on server, client, or anywhere in between



1.2.3.4

?



5.6.7.8

Previous Layer 4 (TCP) technique

Client


- Find client with *globally incrementing IP ID*

IP Header

Version / IHL / TOS	Length
ID	Flags / Fragment Offset
TTL / Protocol	Checksum
Source IP	
Destination IP	

- Windows XP, FreeBSD, etc. globally this ID

Client → Server censored (>1)



Forged SYN




Albuquerque

Layer 3 (IP) techniques

- Layer 3 already has enough side channels
- More general assumptions
- One technique we have is for Linux servers
- Question: can some address talk to some Linux server?
- If that address responds to pings, **then we can measure this!**

IP fragments

- Utilize Linux's *fragment cache* behavior
- IP datagrams are split into fragments when they are too large to go over a medium



Fragment cache

- Fragments are kept in a cache until all fragments arrive and the datagram is complete
- Linux has a “maximum distance” rule:
 - If I receive a fragment for datagram d from address X
 - Then I receive another 64 fragments from X
 - If d hasn't been completed yet, then its other fragments *ain't ever coming*
- Bookkeeping! Side channel!

By way of example

Linux machine

L



Pingable address

P



Can P talk to L?



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Prime L

Linux machine

L



Received 63
fragments
from P since

Pingable address

P



Spoof 63
fragment
first-halves
from P



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Spoof echo request

Linux machine

L



Received 63
fragments
from P since


Pingable address

P



Albuquerque

Spoof large,
fragmented
echo request
from L



Case: Censorship

Linux machine

L



Received 63
fragments
from P since

Pingable address

P



Albuquerque

Case: No censorship

Linux machine

L




Pingable address

P



Fragmented echo reply



Received 65+
fragments
from P since



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Complete datagrams

Linux machine

L



Pingable address

P



Spoof 63
fragment
second-halves
from P
(in same order)



Albuquerque

Censorship cases

- In censorship case:
 - Second halves complete datagram
- In no censorship case:
 - Second halves are too late!
 - The first halves are already gone
 - The second halves create new entries

To actually determine censorship

- Are those 63 entries in there or not?
- How much room is left?
- Send our own pings:
 - Room for (e.g.) 263 \Rightarrow Censorship
 - Room for (e.g.) 200 \Rightarrow No censorship

Deploying vantage points

- Almost 10% of IPv4 address space responds to large pings
 - Over 16% of China's space
- To deploy 10 vantage points...
 - Ping 100 random IP addresses
 - Which 10 respond to large pings?
 - That's it!

Ethical considerations



- Vantage points do not send pings—they respond to pings
- Measure an entire (e.g.) /24
 - Make it look like someone is ping sweeping